While the United States made loud threats to punish Iran, Iraq quietly prospered. Saddam Hussein publicly declared that Iraq sought only independent development, not Middle Eastern hegemony—a striking shift from his usual ambitions. Many saw this as Saddam stepping back after the Gulf War's devastation, but in reality, he was regrouping, building strength for a comeback.
Because Iraq kept a low profile, U.S. attention zeroed in on Iran. In other words, it was Iran that stumbled into Uncle Sam's crosshairs at a critical moment. To the Americans, there were only two kinds of countries: those "free and democratic," marching in lockstep with U.S. values, and "dictatorial regimes" opposing those values. Iran fit squarely in the latter category, marked for conquest.
Faced with Washington's economic sanctions and public condemnation, Iran could not stand idle. They had to find a way to break through the tightening U.S. chokehold.
Recently, Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran's spiritual leader, announced a forthcoming visit to China—an event that captured global attention. Khamenei did not travel lightly; such trips meant urgent international challenges or critical diplomatic missions. This time, the latter was clear: Iran was seeking new strategic partners.
Though foreign visits were traditionally the domain of President Rafsanjani, Khamenei had begun eclipsing him. The political fissures within Iran's leadership were no secret. Khamenei, a former president who had led Iran through the brutal Iran-Iraq War, held immense prestige with the military and populace alike. When the president appeared weak, Khamenei had the influence to challenge or even impeach him.
Many saw Khamenei's China visit as the opening move of a political comeback. Why China rather than the Soviet Union first? Even the CIA was left guessing. Only Khamenei himself knew this was as much a domestic message as an international one: a clear signal to Tehran and the world about who truly held power in Iran.
China, eager to expand influence in the resource-rich Middle East, welcomed the opportunity. Its military-industrial complex buzzed with excitement at the prospect of lucrative contracts with Iran—contracts that would also bolster China's own defense sector.
True to form, Khamenei did not disappoint. During his visit, he proposed a substantial order from China's defense industry—basic but effective weaponry like Type 56 submachine guns and Hongqi air defense missiles. Noting Iraq's recent purchase of Chinese tanks, Khamenei also sought Hongjian anti-tank missiles. Iranian strategists valued Chinese arms for being affordable, practical, and tactically effective without draining their limited military budget.
Though Iran avoided buying heavy tanks or fighter jets this time, focusing instead on defensive systems made Khamenei's intentions clear: this was preparation against a potential invasion.
Following China, Khamenei flew to Moscow, further fueling speculation that the so-called socialist camp was uniting to counter the "democratic and liberal" American bloc.
In Moscow, Khamenei met with Soviet leader Yanayev. Their discussions ranged from economic cooperation to the critical issue of arms trade.
Yanayev wasted no time with pleasantries. "So, buying Grad rocket launchers and SAMs? You seem ready to fight the United States to the last man. Tell me, Khamenei, do you really believe Iran can win a decisive battle against the combined forces of the U.S.?"
Khamenei met the provocation calmly. "President Yanayev, you and I know who our true enemy is. Yes, we need Soviet weapons to strengthen our forces. The Gulf War proved what happens to armies that lack modern arms. The Americans crushed Iraq's once mighty military in mere weeks. The technological gap is undeniable."
He continued, "Given this common enemy, Iran and the Soviet Union must maintain close cooperation. We cannot allow Washington to exploit our divisions."
Yanayev nodded, though skepticism lingered. "I agree, but this will be a long war of attrition. Iran faces the possibility of a decade-long U.S. blockade. Are you confident your country won't capitulate?"
Before Khamenei could respond, Yanayev raised a hand. "No promises necessary. You're a longtime client of Soviet military industry. If you need weapons, we're ready to supply them. But tell me, do you want more than just the Hail and SAM systems?"
"Especially weapons that can inflict large-scale damage on the enemy," Yanayev pressed, bringing up chemical weapons again. He needed to offload the stockpile on Pozruz Island quickly before the UN convention came into force.
Khamenei's response surprised him. Shaking his head, the Iranian leader said calmly, "We don't need chemical weapons right now. If the United States finds an excuse, it will give them a pretext to launch a full-scale war against Iran. Besides, Iran has no strategic depth. Should war break out, we may not last more than a few days."
Yanayev paused, caught off guard. This stance was very different from what Victor had briefed him earlier.
Seeing Yanayev's hesitation, Khamenei added, "The previous agreement still stands. But we believe now is not the right time to proceed."
Suddenly, it clicked for Yanayev. Khamenei's earlier approval of the chemical weapons deal had been a tactical move to leverage Soviet-American rivalry and weaken the domestic moderates. The "deal" was just a cover—an internal power play cloaked in international intrigue.
Anger flickered in Yanayev's eyes, but he couldn't deny it: the man in the white robe was a cunning old fox. In the three-way struggle between Iran, the U.S., and the Soviet Union, Khamenei was the one pulling strings—and the Soviets were left empty-handed.
But Yanayev wasn't about to let Iran outsmart a superpower. He needed to remind Khamenei who held the real leverage.
As a subtle warning—and to recoup losses from the dropped chemical weapons trade—Yanayev secretly raised the prices of all weapons and ammunition by about 7%.
During the visit, Khamenei also requested a batch of BMP armored personnel carriers to bolster Iran's military. But when Yanayev presented the updated price list, Khamenei's mood soured.
"How can it be so expensive? This is almost twenty-five percent higher than our previous agreement!" Khamenei's frown deepened as he accused Yanayev of errors in the manifest.
Yanayev stood firm. "Have you forgotten it's been nearly five years since your last purchase from us? Raw material costs have surged. We've tried to limit these increases, but some things are beyond control."
He added, "If weapons were a one-time transaction, consumables are a long-term cooperation. We expect Iran to conduct multiple military exercises to project strength. For you, consumables will be your main ongoing expense."
Faced with Yanayev's logic, Khamenei had little choice but to sign the contract—though with a calculated trap.
Still, a 25% price hike wasn't a deal-breaker for Iran. Most of their arsenal was Soviet-made or Chinese copies. Without a heavy industry base of their own, Iran had little room to negotiate.
Yanayev smiled quietly as Khamenei signed. Iran had chosen to break its word and use the Soviets for internal politics—now it was paying the price.
Holding the signed contract, Yanayev muttered under his breath, "Do you really think the United States won't attack because you lack chemical weapons? Khamenei, you still underestimate their shamelessness. If war breaks out, don't say I didn't warn you."