POLICY ON EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET VULNERABILITIES
Document Type:
CREST
Collection:
General CIA Records
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80R01731R000900110010-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
15
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 23, 2004
Sequence Number:
10
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 9, 1954
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment Size
PDF icon CIA-RDP80R01731R000900110010-4.pdf 1.05 MB
Body:
jr, Approved F,gr Release 2004/07/08 CIA-RDP80R01731 R00090t+1OO1 O4 Li ayCp '~ C i-' DECLAa Y1k`0 3 .~ a cLAss. C!)TQ: Ts (S c24/5X1 NEXT REV!EW AA i E: AUTH. HS 74? LATE- "'1 ' /t REVIE'WER:_.J I- MEMORANDL14 FCR: Director of Central Intelligence 9 February 1954 SUBJECT : Policy on Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities General Cutler sent you on 15 January a working paper which pro- posed a study to recommend whether the NSC should address itself to elaborat- ing a statement of U. S. policy on the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities. It proposed the creation by the NSC of an ad hoc committee consisting of Cutler, General Smith, C.D. Jackson and yourself, who would, in turn, organize a special committee of representatives from State, Defense, CIA, and JCS. This latter committee would go into the whole question of current policies, current plans, operations and thinking within the agencies and departments concerned and come up with recommendations to the parent ad hoc committee, and through them to the NSC, as to whether further NSC action was desirable. The description of the scope of this study indicates that the people working on it would have to have access to knowledge of all our most sensitive operational activities and assets. Apparently you discussed this matter in General Smith's office some time during the week of January 18-23, and, as a result of that dis- cussion, General Cutler sent you on 26 January another piece of paper which proposed that that section of the OCB Staff which is known as "C.D. Jackson's Special Staff" should first make a staff study which would include a "summary presentation of accepted U. S. policies and practices for the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities as formulated by the departments and agencies con- cerned," a summary of other materials and studies which are utilized as guidance, and a statement of those aspects of U. S. policy which appear to need further development. I gathered from Koons, Cutler's assistant, that the OCB Special Staff would undertake this study by itself and without Agency participation, and that the group which would eventually report to the NSC would not come into existence until after the Special Staff study was completed. The proposed terms of reference of this staff study are attached. I believe it is expected that you will comment on them directly to General Cutler. I confess that my own reaction to the whole proposal is somewhat negative. To be sure, a summary of "Accepted U. S. Policy and Practices" and of the results of previous investigations might be useful and would at worst be innocuous; it would certainly be far preferrable to the rather extensive, high level study originally proposed by General Cutler. But I seriously doubt whether anything very new or useful will be turned up by another study of Soviet vulnerabilities and of the means of exploiting them. We have had not only the rather comprehensive CENIS study but also the work we will shortly complete in and a large flow of continuing studies in private research organizat ons, in the F_ -1 and else- where. As to the means of exploitation, this is after all the focus of "!3-78051 NSC REVIEW Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R00.0900110Oj 4f 3 COMPLETED, 10/31/04. PA "Ir 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release /07/08-1:-(14--RDP80RO1731 R000900110010-4 the 0 Project and we are far enough along with it to convince me that there are few, if any, important areas of policy which have not at least been explored one time or another. The feeling persists, I know, that there must be something quite significant, and (hopefully) relatively inexpensive, that we could do to exploit the weaknesses of a monolithic, over-centralized society if only we were clever enough to discover it. Certainly the vulnerabilities of such a society should be under constant; study. Nevertheless, I am inclined to believe that the sort of majQrr new project originally proposed by General Cutler would be a waste of intellectual and executive resources and should be discouraged. Under the circumstances, I would suggest that if you comment orally to General Cutler you may wish to express some skepticism about another major examination of policy while agreeing that the preliminary staff study of present policy would be helpful. Assuming that the latter is to go forward., however, I would think it desirable to have some one from the Agency at least affiliated with it from its beginning. This will give us the background that we should have if any subsequent work is to be undertaken and, more important, it would give some one representing this Agency an opportunity to see what the Special Staff was doing, particularly in informing itself as to the policy and practices followed by this Agency. discussed this sort of arrangement briefly with Koons who saw no objection to it. One more specific suggestion I would make is that General Cutler and the members of the OCB be reminded of the terms of reference of and that any preliminary findings of that Project which might be helpful- to the staff study be made available informally to the Special Staff. If you agree with this point of view, I would suggest that you advise General Cutler along the lines of the attached. If you wish me to follow the staff study for the Agency, I will try to inform myself as to the amount of time that will be required. If it is very considerable, I may ask to borrow part of the time of one of the men now assigned to to represent me in meetings with the OCB Special Staff. RICHARD M. B SELL Special Assista' to DCI Attachment Secret Memo to Robert Cutler sj- 8051 Y / of 3 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 200 08,.,q1 P80R01731 ROQ0900110010-4 L Approved F rRelease 2004 ki8?T`~ IA-'PDP80R01 R00!~.( --$'f 1tt-4 ?^ January 26, 195 You will remember our discussion in Bedell's office last week relative to a project to develop a policy for exploiting Soviet vulnerabilities. C. D. Jackson's 0CB Special Staff group has come up with the attached terms of reference for pulling together the material on this subject. Before he left, C. D. saw them and felt that this was the correct approach. They seem satisfactory to me, as long as the Group's final report is concise and in the neighborhood of about 20 pages. You and Bedell may have some further ideas and suggested changes, following which I think they can get under way. C. D. suggested that Skip Koons work with the Group, which he can do within the limits of his normal work over here. Sincerely yours, ROBERT CUT Special Assistant to the President The Honorable Allen W. Dulles Director, Central Intelligence Agency 21430 E Street, N.W. Washington 25, D.C. Approved For Re%?se 20040HI;RDP80R01731 80900110010-4 Approved FbbrRelease 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80R01 I R00090011001 In order further to 1the des rabtli I _) s^'.` Al, development of U.S. policy or C:e a:;pioitaitor e?f. .1nerabil Lties 91n~ tth. veto, mdertake a staff st_-. ble; rely t HaLsl= of acc.e lted Vy.b?. 1--l1A.c' aa1C .'ractices oitatl= of o:jiat vulrceralbUitles CIS forr alated b. departments a ager.cies corcer iv-d tevens' report, etc.). not accepted as of f c r-I polio mk- to to c. lba at .l ized ummary p:esentati.or, of other jor ty ri i 1 c tough idame C '} } ~ togetreer with the tat, . o: achy studies or materials within, the gonernt and the ar.;a of agree:'=Lt or dia ree,.ent concerning their ; we e. whore there appears to be a rye . for t-14-c furt. er develop, statement of those aspects of ;:.Z. sI i c in t 113 m+ nt of exist: policy or provision. of nee policy. 2. In the evc nt that the s s co r bensive or specific dzvelo the r11?ir:. s Jtyy of exploitation o let vulnerabilities oit=:er k,4-, icy for the pecial staff can make r :cor :jeI ct' .ons as to and procedure. fit. The % Special Staff is to b aoper-t Qn J IV appropriate departments and a ,c .cies in day ;login -,e a'x:ve s Approved For ReJ ,se 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731 RQQ9900110010-4 SECRET.. Ap roved For R~~ VAj@W J F ,2000 0v 7T00 TOP SK y1_1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP L 611[y 13Y HAND Rm. 2044 "K" Bldg INITIALS DATE APPROVAL ACTION COMMENT CONCURRENCE INFORMATION DIRECT REPLY SIGNATURE RETURN PREPARATION OF REPLY [_I DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION [_1 FILE Remarks: :Attached is the paper on Soviet Vulnerabilities which the Director was holdina_ for Dick Bissell. 0-4 25X1 Ap~rc r ReIe8 p1 7l08 : q,&'ip. 20173 ggq?kjW0 0-4 SEP 941 30-4 16-68548-I U. S. UOVERNMENT PRINTING OIFlCE 1 Approve Approve W orlRelease 2004/07~U~~MG~~i4-RDP~~~ON'~i3~1 R0 F Y se ,4~Q~IIA61-1EAIf1; Rp@60R01731 ROO (Date) TO: - BUILDING aOOM NQ. REMARKS: FROM: FORM N0. 16-66268-1 OPO SEP 1946- 36-8 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R000900110010-4 ;iua v l . 1 Qr lj The Honorable Allen W. Dulles Director, Central Intelligence AF*erc,?y 2)30 E Street , N .VV . Washington, D.C. Attached please Bird the draft working paper mentioned. to you tv tr. Cutler which might serve as a basis for dlscussi.or next Tuesday. ncere_ v wars. T. I?:'; Pd S N>C S ec-i_al Staff t oaatat M No. /d Review of this dooaweat ly CIA bait determined that Li C1,4 has as ob{oHioa to destas0 q it Cantatas iatermation of CIA intersst that must rota Oiaait?ed at is ' ,AYtbttdityt me 1W H ;s,ntat #athist et Ct k- R4VWwArF 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80ROl731 80009001 T0010-4 TOP SECRET d or declassi- ~ 4Cl A CCIi.IFS i,urhGn h1~FfR" rTl7r"'J ~~~*F t ~/W ~wqr riYl -RC7F"6~11CV f 7 J I RUUU~UU I I V V ~~-4 P -- CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TO NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and 25X'1 DOCUMENT NO, y 7 DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below . _ _ ____ Control for record. S t RELEASED WITNESSED BY (Signature) CIA CONTROL NO. 17 Go 51 SEEN BY DATE App a 1J~d For Rel 9s'd `1004/07/08 CI DP80RO1731 TOP SECRET OFFICE R000900110010-4 Approved*f or Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP8DR01731 R0009 t D44atpegt, #o, flevl w of this docvient by NA in determined that b Ctb `has ae oblacfon fs dectsst Q i4 aontalns information of CIA h hared _thaf mast rest C . otds fig it' ' A 4 roved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 R000900110010-4 ( tlt4an8L~ _ 7 gUd -)-- 25X /'. trrjW Approvecr Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP8R01731 R0009001100 GO Approved For Relez 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP8`OR01731 R000 0110010-4 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP8~R01731 R000900110011 Approved For Rellve 2004/07/08 CIA-RDP80R01731 RO 0900110010-4 Approved For Rele 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP8OR01731 R0Q0 I x Approved" r Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP8 TAP SEGREI' Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP8R01731 R0 0110010-4 Approved For RAIease 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP8 R01 731 R000900 SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET DOCUt NT DESCRIPTION REGISTRY SOURCE NSC CIA CONTROL NO. 78002 DOC. NO. _ DATE DOC. RECD. DOC. Date January 18, 1954 COpy No. Draft caAon LOGGED BY No. of pages rtnr NO. OF ATTACHMENTS none ATTENTION: THIS FORM WILL BE ATTACHED TO EACH TOP SECRET DOCUMENT RECEIVED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OR CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET WITHIN THE CIA AND WILL REMAIN ATTACHED TO THE DOCUMENT UNTIL SUCH TIME AS IT IS DOWNGRADED, DESTROYED OR TRANSMITTED OUTSIDE OF CIA. ACCESS TO TOP SECRET MATERIAL IS LIMITED TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHOSE OF- FICIAL DUTIES RELATE TO THE MATERIAL. EACH ALTERNATE OR ASSISTANT TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER WHO RECEIVES AND/OR RELEASES THE ATTACHED TOP SECRET MATERIAL WILL SIGN THIS FORM AND INDICATE PERIOD OF CUSTODY IN THE LEFT-HAND COL- UMNS PROVIDED. THE NAME OF EACH INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS SEEN THE TOP SECRET DOCUMENT AND THE DATE OF HANDLING SHOULD INDICATED RIGHT-HAND REFERRED TO RECEIVED RELE ASED SEEN BY OFFICE SIGNATURE DATE TIME DATE TIME _ _ NAME & OFFICE SYMBOL DATE SD/I 18 10:1 loe Document No. Review at thos d cement by CIA Ma - - - ,datermtt%d tail.) CIA has Ao ohieotton to Arc ss /ry / NO. Alm =_LJl l J 7 song interest tdat must rem ketdoritgr HR 7C.7 ti nta' nutLing yt e Date sr ewe ,~ NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: WHEN THIS FORM IS DETACHED FROM TOP SECRET MATERIAL IT SHALL BE COMPLETED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACES BELOW AND TRANSMITTED TO CENTRAL TOP SECRET CONTROL OR_ RECORD, THE TOP SECRET MATERIAL DETACHED FROM THIS FORM WAS: - BY (SIGNATURE) DOWNGRADED C1 _ DESTROYED L-i _ DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) TO OFFICE DATE -ft od opwow-pa%, p1mi"llm I line Im vp m"Irg"RRY14 .9 -2 m Ll nnnrmw I e - - dbe FORM NO. JAN 1950 x-13 TOP SECRET
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