WebNovels

Chapter 4 - 04 on Àwa Ama A ma?

Approved For Realise 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP81B00493R0W100090009-5

14 November 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Di Meet in with President-Elect's Staff

On 13 November the DID met with Messrs. Meese, Casey,

and Allen at his EOB office. The DDCI, Bob Gates, and I

were also present.

1. The DC1 raised the question of providing the PDB. Mr. Meese

requested that we begin to supply the PDB to the President-elect at

716 Jackson Place beginning next Tuesday. Governor Reagan will be in

town through Friday and will then return to California. We should con-

tinue to supply the PDB in California beginning on Saturday. The Gov-

ernor will be in Washington for the week of 8 December and possibly for

another week in January. In this connection, we were asked about secure

communications. We told them we had secure communications to an office

in Los Angeles, but not to any area near the ranch. They told us they

wanted to keep their operations in Los Angeles; and that they would pre-

fer that any classified material or communications be handled in our

installation. We agreed to look into the questions of secure phones

both in Washington and Los Angeles. (I subsequently determined that

the Los Angeles office has a secure phone and that one is available

for installation at some location in Washington; we have not yet de-

termined a location.

2. The DC3 showed our visitor the PDB and described its function,

making the point that the PDB is done to the President's specifications

and we would hope to use the period between now and inauguration to

determine how the President-elect would like it done. The only comment

made was that a larger typeface would probably be in order.

3. They asked that in addition to the clearances that we had pro-

vided for the three of them we should clear Wineburger, Taft, Ikle, and

Deaver. We noted that while they had SI/TK clearances, they did not

yet have any of the operational clearances or the security briefings

that go with them. It was left that we would work this out as well.

4. We then discussed briefings of the President-elect. The DO

provided a proposed agenda (Attachment A). It was agreed that we would

give two briefings to Governor Reagan when he is in Washington next week.

The first one will consist of a description of the organization and

functions of the Community and CIA plus the I lin

the attachment. We subsequently determined that this will be given

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81B00493R000100090009-5

Approved For Re"tease 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP81B00493R811/100090009-5

between 0945 and 1115 on Wednesday. On Thursday at the same times we

will provide a briefing on the first three topics of "II". When Governor

Reagan returns in December, we will brief on "V" and the remainder of

"II". The specific arrangements for these briefings will be made later.

The possibility was also raised that briefings on material in "IV" might

be briefed to Governor Reagan in California. It is unclear to what ex-

tent "III" will be treated in appropriate places in the substantive

briefings and to what extent it will be dealt with under "V". Mr. Casey

also raised the possibility that the DO might be asked to brief his

policy committee when it meets in Washington on Friday of next week.

5. There followed an extended discussion on particular legislation

and budgetary issues that concerned us in the immediate future. It was

agreed that the DDCI would provide a paper to Allen on our legislation

requirements. We were told that on budget issues the DDCI should deal

directly with Wineburger and it was made clear that the intelligence

support of the President-elect and his immediate staff was to be handled

through Allen and not through the transition team. The link will be

from me to Allen. More generally, Meese asked that we prepare our "wish

list" for the new Administration.

6. The Kla also suggested that they might wish to come out for

breakfast or lunch to meet with the Agency leadership. They expressed

an interest in doing it if they had time at some later date.

7. I also provided to them an FBIS memorandum on foreign reaction

to the election. (See Attachment B).

Richard Lehman

Chairman

National Intelligence Council

Attachments

A& B

Distribution:

1 - D/OCO

1 - Transition File

1 - C/NIC Chrono

2

Approved For Release 2004/07108: CIA-RDP81B00493R000100090009-5

Approved For Rdirase 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81B00493ROM100090009-5

Categories of Possible Intelligence Briefings for President-Elect

I. Current issues with near term policy implications.

Poland

Iran-Iraq war

Iran - hostages

Afghanistan

Nicaragua - El Salvador

Middle East - Israel, Saudi Arabia

II. Longer term issues fundamental to US foreign policy.

Strategic force balance

NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance

Soviet economy

State of NATO Alliance

China - economy, leadership

III. Current operational involvements.

Afghanistan

Iran

China

IV. Current issues with policy implications in the midterm

Zimbabwe

Kampuchea

Lebanon

World energy situation

Philippines

Pakistan

Yemens

Somalia

Turkey

Morocco

25X1

V. Background on intelligence

Apirvcd Frir Ralpaco 2nna/07/nR • riA_RnpRiRnmcniznnninnnqnnnq_c

TATINTL

Approved For RelealtrONAMIC.ItilaDAM3

- 1 -

FOREIGN MEDIA REACTION

TO THE 1980 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

HIGHLIGHTS

Moscow's public reaction is designed to hold out prospects for

an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations under the Reagan admin-

istration. Characterizing the election outcome as a rejection

of President Carter's policy toward the USSR, Moscow commentators

have conveyed to the Soviet domestic audience a generally

reassuring view of the probable impact of the Reagan pres.idency

an U.S. international policy.

East European reaction has paralleled Moscow's in discounting

the significance of Governor Reagan's hardline reputation and in

accenting the view that realism and self-interest will steer the

new administration toward policies compatible with constructive

East-West relations.

West European editorial opinion has divided along traditional

liberal-conservative lines while generally welcoming what is seen

as a likelihood of greater consistency in U.S. foreign policy.

A number of West German, French, and British commentators have

questioned whether Governor Reagan will be sufficiently sensitive

to the European viewpoint, discerning in some of his past public

positions on issues like SALT and the Middle East a potential

for discord between the United States and Europe.

In the Middle East, Egyptian comment has echoed President as-Sadat

in coupling praise for President Carter's contributions to the

peace process with assurances of Cairo's desire for continued

cooperation with the United States. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and

several of the Gulf states have reaffirmed support for existing

ties with Washington while calling for a "more objective" U.S.

approach to the Arab-Israeli question. Israeli media, registering

guarded optimism about prospects for U.S.-Israeli relations, have

speculated that the Reagan administration may revive the dormant

"Jordanian option" in an effort to accelerate the peace process.

Approved For Release 2004/07108: CIA-RDP81B00493R000100090009-5

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

More Chapters